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Market Power as a Threshold Requirement in
Antitrust Summary Judgments: Assam Drug Co. v.
Miller Brewing Co.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently created a new requirement for plaintiffs under the Sherman Act.
Plaintiffs must now first prove that a defendant possesses substantial
market power 1 before they will be allowed to proceed with their antitrust cases. 2 While this requirement obviously increases the burden
upon plaintiffs, it also has the potential for making that burden overwhelming. For example, because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
requires the plaintiff to have a sufficient factual basis before filing the
complaint, courts could require plaintiffs to have proof of market power
before filing a complaint-without the benefit of discovery. The Ninth
Circuit recently affirmed a case under these circumstances. 3 In fact, the
Ninth Circuit• has also followed the Eighth Circuit's lead in imposing
the market power requirement, as has the Seventh Circuit;~ other
courts may follow as well.
The first case to impose a preliminary requirement of showing
substantial market power was an earlier Eighth Circuit case affirming
the summary judgment of a case brought under South Dakota's antitrust statute, Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co. 6 Because of the
similarity between the South Dakota statute and the Sherman Act, 7 the
court employed the same basic analysis applied to actions brought
under the federal antitrust laws. 8 This similarity allowed the Eighth
Circuit to extend the market power requirement to federal cases under
1. Market power is simply the ability of a firm to control the disposition of a product.
2. Ryko Mfg. v. Eden Servs., 821 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987).
3. Continental Maritime v. Pacific Coast Metal Trades, 817 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1987); See
Popofsky & Goodwin, The "Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason Revisited, 56 ANTITRUST L. J. 195,
209-12 (1988).
4. R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 67,483
reh'g granted 841 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1988).
5. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987).
6. 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986).
7. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 37-1-3.1 (1977), provides in part: "A contract, combination,
or conspiracy between two or more persons in restraint of trade or commerce any part of which is
within this state is unlawful."
Section One of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), provides in part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
8. 798 F.2d at 313.
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the Sherman Act. 9 Because the rationale of Assam Drug has been extended to Sherman Act cases by the Eighth Circuit, with other circuits
following suit, and because the rationale upsets the traditional balance
in antitrust litigation by creating a possibly insurmountable burden for
plaintiffs, the case merits critical examination.
This casenote begins with a brief review of the applicable antitrust
law. The note then examines the rationale of the Assam Drug decision
and concludes that it is flawed because it conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent. The note argues further that the court has instead imposed
its own set of political beliefs which turn out to be less than satisfactory. This note concludes that since both the decision and the philosophy it is based on are misguided, the case should not be followed.
l.

INTRODUCTION

The antitrust laws, and specifically Section One of the Sherman
Act, are designed to prevent restraint of trade. 10 In fact, read literally,
they prohibit any restraint of trade. 11 But in reality, all contracts restrain or restrict in some way. Not surprisingly, a "judicial gloss" has
been placed on these prohibitions whereby only unreasonable restraints
are prohibited. 12
To determine whether restraints are unreasonable, they are first
classified as either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal restraints are
agreements among competitors while vertical restraints are agreements
within the chain of distribution. 13 There are different types of vertical
restraints as well. Vertical price restraints are things such as minimum
retail prices imposed upon distributors or retailers by manufacturers.
Examples of vertical nonprice restraints are restrictions on customers a
distributor may sell to or areas in which he may sell.
Once a restraint is classified, its reasonableness is analyzed under
one of two different standards: the per se rule or the rule of reason.
Horizontal restraints and vertical price restraints are traditionally governed by per se rules/ 4 vertical nonprice restraints are governed by the
rule of reason. 15
9. Ryko Mfg. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 121S, 1231 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct.
7SI (1988).
10. IS U.S.C. §I (1982).
II. Section One of the Sherman Act, IS U.S.C. § I (1982), provides in part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
12. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 60 (1911 ).
13. The chain of distribution involves the supplier, distributor and retailer.
14. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 40S U.S. S96, 608 (1972).
IS. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
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Per se violations are "certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
-caused or the business excuse for their use." 16 Per se rules treat the
restraint as being illegal without need of any further inquiry. "The per
se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an antitrust plaintiff
successfully plays it, he need only tally his score." 17
Rule of reason treatment, on the other hand, rather than making a
restraint automatically illegal, invites the court to examine a restraint
in the light of various factors and determine its reasonableness. 18 Under
the rule of reason "the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as
imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." 19
While the law in this area has changed dramatically over the last
two decades, changes concerning vertical nonprice restraints have been
most spectacular. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 20 the United
States Supreme Court refused to apply a per se rule to a vertical nonprice agreement. Four years later, however, in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 21 the Court held that vertical nonprice restrictions
were per se violations of the Sherman Act. 22 Nevertheless, this rule was
overturned ten years later in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 23 in favor of rule of reason analysis for vertical non price agreements.24 This does not mean that vertical nonprice restraints are never
analyzed under per se rules; as will be seen, per se rules are used in
some circumstances. 211 GTE Sylvania merely holds that there is a presumption of rule of reason treatment for vertical nonprice restraints. 26
Concurrent with all of the activity involving vertical nonprice restraints, the role of summary judgment in antitrust has undergone dramatic changes as well. Following PolZer v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 27 summary judgment of antitrust cases became disfavored.
Six years later, however, in First National Bank v. Cities Service
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980).
The rule of reason is discussed in detail in Part III.
433 U.S. at 49.
372 U.S. 253 (1963).
388 U.S. 365 (1967).

/d.
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
/d.
See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
/d.
368 U.S. 464 (1962).
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Co., 28 the Court made it clear that antitrust cases are not exempt from
summary judgment.
While we recognize the importance of preserving litigants' rights to a
trial on their claims, we are not prepared to extend those rights to the
point of requiring that anyone who files an antitrust complaint setting
forth a valid cause of action be entitled to a full-dress trial notwithstanding the absence of any significant probative evidence tending to
support the complaint. 29

The Court's newfound approbation of summary judgment in antitrust was made clear in 1986 with Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 30 one of three decisions that term encouraging
the use of the procedure in all types of cases. 31 Nevertheless, Poller,
which held that summary judgment should be used "sparingly" in antitrust has never been overruled and summary judgment is still used conservatively in antitrust cases because the issues tend to be complex and
difficult. 32
These two controversial areas of antitrust law, treatment of vertical nonprice restraints and summary judgment, converged in Assam
Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co. 33 There the court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit ruled against the plaintiff in an antitrust case holding
that a showing of a defendant's market power was a preliminary requirement. Specifically, the court stated that "a defendant who establishes, in accordance with the rules governing summary judgment, that
it lacks market power a fortiori establishes that no genuine issue of
material fact exists and is entitled to entry of judgment in its favor as a
matter of law." 34 The court's reasoning was as follows: The alleged
misconduct involved a vertical nonprice restraint. Such restraints are
governed by the rule of reason. The rule of reason requires a showing
of market power. Summary judgment applies to antitrust cases. Therefore the market power test applies to this antitrust summary judgment
motion.
This argument fails in two respects. First, the premise that market
power is a threshold requirement of the rule of reason is false. Second,
even if that premise is true, the conclusion that the market power test
28. 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
29. /d. at 290.
30. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
31. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (antitrust);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (products liability); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (first amendment).
32. See e.g., Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1584 (11th Cir. 1988).
33. 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986).
34. !d. at 317.
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applies to summary judgments in antitrust cases does not necessarily
follow from the premises, thus the argument is invalid.

II.

THE

Assam Drug

CASE

The plaintiff in this case, Assam Drug Co. (Assam), was a retail
seller of beer and other alcoholic beverages in South Dakota. Beginning
in 1976 Assam bought its Miller Brewing Co. (Miller) products
through a distributor in a different geographical region because that
distributor offered a lower price and an attractive discounting policy. In
1983, however, Miller prohibited its distributors from selling outside
their limited geographical area and Assam was forced to buy from its
local distributor at higher prices. Assam brought suit in South Dakota
state court, alleging restraint of trade. Miller removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by
an affidavit that its market share was less than 20%. Assam offered
nothing to counter Miller's depiction of market share. 35 Thereupon the
district court granted Miller's motion for summary judgment and the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The circuit court
stated that in order to narrow the "unlimited inquiry necessary under
the rule of reason," it adopted a new requirement "at the threshold that
the plaintiff attacking a vertical nonprice restraint prove the defendant's
substantial market power in a relevant market." 36 The court concluded
that a 20% market share did not amount to substantial market power
and thus summary disposition was appropriate. 37
The restraint involved in Assam Drug arose out of Miller's imposition of restrictions on its distributors-preventing them from selling to
any distributors from any other geographic area. It was not a horizontal restraint because there was no agreement between competitors. Nor
was it a vertical price restraint because there was no specific imposition
of a retail price. The restriction was a vertical nonprice restraint,
which, as the court correctly determined, should be analyzed under the
,..-rule of reason. In its application of the rule of reason, however, the
Assam Drug court missed the mark.

III.

THE RULE OF REASON

There are a number of different ideas, both in scholarly literature
and case law, about rule of reason analysis. Professor Areeda indicates
that the inquiry is three-pronged: (1) Identify what harm to competi35. !d.
36. !d. at 315-16.
37. Id. at 313.
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tion results or may result from the collaborators' activities; (2) Determine the nature and magnitude of the 'redeeming virtues' of the challenged collaboration; and (3) Determine whether there are 'less
restrictive alternatives' to the challenged restraint. 38
According to Professor Sullivan, there are five steps in a rule of
reason analysis: (1) Identify the specific practice; (2) Determine the
purpose of the restraint; (3) Identify the likely effects of the practice;
(4) Consider how the challenged practice will affect competitive interaction in the industry; and (5) Determine whether, on balance, the restriction substantially impedes competition. 39
Judge Posner and Judge Bork, on the other hand, argue that all
vertical restrictions should be legal per se and suggest complete elimination of the rule. 40 Short of such a drastic alternative, they invite
courts to meet them at an intermediate position. At this middle ground
between per se legality and traditional rule of reason analysis, they
urge courts to take "shortcuts" such as making a plaintiff first show
that a "defendant has market power (that is, power to raise prices significantly above the competitive level without losing all of one's business)."41 They recommend this approach for two reasons: First, because traditional rule of reason analysis is long and complex, any
shortcut to avoid that arduous process will be welcome. Second, the
shortcut is justified because if a firm does not have market power, it
cannot control the market and therefore cannot affect competition. The
requirement of a threshold showing of market power is the distinctive
feature of the Posner-Bork approach, in contrast to the broad-based
approaches advocated by Areeda and Sullivan.
An examination of Supreme Court case law reveals that the
Court's approach is more similar to the Areeda and Sullivan approaches than the Posner-Bark approach. The classic statement of the
rule of reason was made by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts

38. P. AREEDA, THE "Ruu: OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 2
(1981).
39. L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 187-88 (1977).
40. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 25 (1981); Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977
SuP. CT. REv. 171, 190-92.
41. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742,745 (7th Cir. 1982)(Posner, J.).
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peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 42

More recently, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,'u
the Court characterized the rule of reason this way: "Under this rule,
the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. " 44
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States/ 5
the Court held that "competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons why it was imposed." 46
All of these cases indicate that rule of reason analysis entails the
examination of a multitude of factors. Nowhere is market power singled out as a threshold requirement of rule of reason analysis.
Consider the most recent statement by the Court on the subject.
The Solicitor General correctly observes: "While the reasonableness
of a particular alleged restraint often depends on the market power of
the parties involved, because a judgment about market power is the
means by which the effects of the conduct on the market place can be
assessed, market power is only one test of 'reasonableness.' " 47

Not only do the Supreme Court cases fail to provide support for
the threshold showing of market power requirement, another recent
trend in Supreme Court cases suggests that such a requirement would
not be approved by the Court. In GTE Sylvania the plaintiff argued
that the defendant's acts should be treated under a per se analysis
rather than rule of reason. The Court, however, held that "departure
from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing." 48
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co./ 9 the Court reaffirmed the idea that a showing of market
power is required for per se treatment, not rule of reason analysis.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
(1984).
48.
49.

246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
/d. at 49 (emphasis added).
435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978).
/d. at 692.
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 n.42
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
472 U.S. 284 (1985).
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"Unless the [firm] possesses market power or exclusive access to an
element essential to effective competition, [per se treatment] is not warranted .... Absent such a showing ... courts should apply a rule-ofreason analysis. " 110
Most recently, the Court stated that "there is a presumption in
favor of a rule-of-reason standard; that departure from that standard
must be justified by demonstrable economic effect . . . . " 111 Thus, although there is a presumption of rule of reason treatment for a vertical
nonprice restraint, such a restraint may be analyzed under the per se
rule if some economic effect like market power is shown.
These recent Supreme Court cases stand for the proposition that
for a plaintiff to get the benefit of per se treatment she must make a
threshold showing of economic effect. Horizontal and vertical price restraints are presumed to have that effect; vertical nonprice restraints,
however, require an actual showing of economic effect in order to get
the benefit of per se analysis. If a vertical nonprice restraint plaintiff is
unable to make that showing, she will then have to settle for rule of
reason analysis. It would make no sense, however, to also require a
threshold showing of market power under the rule of reason because
the inability to show market power is what causes a plaintiff to seek
rule of reason treatment.
Tacking on a threshold requirement of showing market power
under rule of reason results in the vitiation of the rule; the rule becomes redundant in that plaintiffs who can show market power will
always neglect rule of reason in favor of the more preferential per se
treatment, while plaintiffs who cannot show market power will be prevented from using the rule. As a practical matter, the rule is completely
eliminated-the very goal of those who recommend the shortcut. 112 The
Supreme Court, however, has not indicated any willingness to do away
with the rule of reason. To the contrary, in GTE Sylvania, the Court
adopted rule of reason treatment for vertical nonprice restraints and
last term, in Business Electronics, the Court said that "rules in this
area should be formulated with a view towards protecting the doctrine
50. !d. at 296-97. See also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
Since the purpose of ... market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, proof of actual detrimental effects .
. . can ohviate the need for an inquiry into market power .... [Tjhe finding of actual,
sustained adverse effects on competition ... is legally sufficient to support a finding
that the challenged restraint was unreasonable even in the absence of elaborate market
analysis.
/d. at 460-61.
51. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (1988).
52. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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of GTE Sylvania. " 53
Another practical effect of requiring a threshold showing of market power is to make it more difficult for private plaintiffs to prove
their cases. What constitutes a showing of substantial market power is
far from clear. Is market share alone sufficient? If not, what else is
required? If market share alone is sufficient, is there a bright line percentage? Even if there is a bright line, how do you define the market to
apply it to? There are no clear answers to these questions. 54 Plaintiffs
are forced to guess at what constitutes substantial market power. The
result is to discourage plantiffs and thus discourage private enforcement
of the antitrust laws. This is in direct contravention of the Clayton
Act. 55 "Congress created the treble-damage remedy of sec[ tion] 5 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the
antitrust laws and deterring violations. " 56
One final problem with the market power approach is that the
different types of restraints (horizontal, vertical price and vertical nonprice) usually do not fit easily into specific categorization. "The dichotomy between the per se and rule of reason categories is far less sharp
than first appears. " 117 The Court has identified some practices as being
so heinous that economic effect is just taken for granted. 58 For example,
per se rules are used without hesitation if a case involves price fixing. 59
And although the restraint in Assam Drug was a territorial restriction,
its effects are quite similar to price fixing in that the retailer is restricted to buying from only one distributor, giving that distributor
complete control of the price. That control resulted in the retailer being
forced to pay a higher price. Because this effect is so much like a price
restriction, which would be per se illegal, the operation of the rule of
reason in this case should yield a similar result. A threshold require53. 108 S. Ct. at 1521.
54. See e.g., Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, 526 F.2d 1196 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 959. One further complication is that the law on market power
is derived from monopolization cases, not restraint of trade cases.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 ( 1982).

56. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). The legislative history reveals that private treble damage actions were conceived primarily as "open[ing] the door ofjustice to every man,
whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ ing] the injured party
ample damages for the wrong suffered." 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 ( 1914) (quoted in Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)).
57. P.
(1981)

AREEDA, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: Gt:NERA!. ISSUES

58. United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
59. /d.

2
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ment of showing market power which precludes that similar result is
without merit. Because of this, and especially because it goes against
the direction the Supreme Court has pointed, the premise that market
power is a threshold requirement is false. Because this premise fails,
the Assam Drug court's entire argument also fails.

IV.

SuMMARY juDGMENT

Nevertheless, even if one grants arguendo that the Assam Drug
court's premises are true, the argument still fails because its conclusion
that the market power test applies to antitrust summary judgments does
not necessarily follow from those premises.
As discussed above, 60 the court adopted the following argument:
The alleged misconduct involved a vertical nonprice restraint. Such restraints are governed by the rule of reason. The rule of reason requires
a threshold showing of market power. Summary judgment is available
in antitrust cases. Therefore the market power test applies to summary
judgment motions in antitrust cases. Assuming that all four premises
are true, it still does not follow, however, that just because summary
judgment may be used in antitrust cases, that the market power test is
an appropriate requirement in motions for summary judgment of antitrust cases.
The reason is that although summary judgment may be used in
antitrust cases, it can only be used in certain conditions and situations
outlined in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of
the way the market power test works, however, it precludes those conditions from ever being present and thus obviates use of the market
power test in antitrust summary judgment.
Rule 56 provides in part that a motion for summary judgment:
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 61

But the Supreme Court has held that at the summary judgment
stage, the judge is not to weigh the evidence, determine the truth of the
matter, or even make findings of fact. His only task is to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. This amounts to determining
whether there are any "genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved
60. See supra text following note 34.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
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in favor of either party." 62
The market power test is itself a factual issue that is to be resolved
by the finder of fact.
This analysis begins by defining the relevant market in which the
court is to evaluate market power. It then examines the following
characteristics of the market in which the defendant competes: ( 1) the
level of concentration in the industry; (2) the extent of product differentiation; and (3) the height of barriers to entry in the market. Finally, it examines the defendant supplier's position in the market to
determine whether it is a core member of a tightly-knit oligopoly detected in the previous inquiry or, if no such oligopoly exists, whether
the defendant possesses substantial market power independently ...
The courts have declined, however, to establish a bright-line standard
to indicate how great a supplier's market share must be before the
restrictions at issue should be considered unreasonable. Although their
reluctance to promulgate such a standard is certainly due in part to a
need to preserve flexibility, it also indicates their recognition that
other factors affect the significance of market share in assessing market power. Perhaps most important are the number and size of the
other firms in the industry. For example, a ten percent market share
may confer a great deal of power in a severely fragmented industry
where there are numerous other suppliers, none of which has a market share even remotely comparable to that held by the largest firm. 63

According to Professor Sullivan, a thorough analysis of power involves "intricacies and imponderables." 64 Judge Posner says, "Plaintiff
must prove that the defendant has a large market share-how large is
unclear." He points out two inherent difficulties. First, "relevant-market definition in antitrust cases is uncertain; in many cases a plaintiff
may be able to persuade the fact finder to define a market in which the
defendant has a substantial share." Second, "there is no agreement as
to how great the defendant's market share must be to satisfy the threshold condition of substantial market power." 611
62. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 742, 250 (1986).
63. Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CAL L.
REV. 13, 30-35 (1980).
64. L. SUI.I.IVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 187-88 (1977).
65. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 6, 16-17 (1981). But see Schwarzer, Making the Rule of Reason
Analysis More Manageable-Panel Discussion, 56 ANTITRUST L. J. 233 (1988):
.Judge Schwarzer: I think most determinations of what is a relevant market and the
power of the defendant or defendants within that market are decided on objective economic data and what is in dispute is not the economic data, not the evidence, but the
conclusions that are drawn from it. So, I think that in many cases it is susceptible to
decision on summary judgment; it is not a jury question at all.
Jd. at 234.
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The basic problem with the market power test is the identification
of market share with market power. Although market share is somewhat easily measured, it does not always give an accurate indication of
what actual market power is.
Market share alone in the beer industry does not reflect the potential
for anticompetitive results .... For example, in the beer market one
of the competitive characteristics is the high cost of entry into the
market. Barriers to entry are a significant factor in a participant's
power to exert an anticompetitive effect . . . . Since relatively few
firms share a large percentage of the beer market, high barriers to
entry can magnify the effects of industry-wide vertical agreements,
such as the agreements at issue in this case. For this reason alone, the
market shares of the individual brewers should not be a basis on
which we grant summary judgment. ... Market share as a threshold
question is not determinative of market power. 66
The Assam Drug court, however, seems to ignore this fact. It
states that in order to establish market power, "the plaintiff must show
that the defendant has a dominant market share in a well-defined relevant market." 67 But, as the case cited by the court goes on to state,
"[ t ]he relevant product and geographic market is a question of fact ...
." 68 Thus the market power test, because it creates a genuine issue of
material fact is not appropriate in motions for summary judgment.

V.

PoLicY

The Assam Drug court adopted the market power shortcut in order to narrow the "unlimited inquiry necessary under the rule of reason."69 This quest for simplification, however, cannot override the
guidelines from the Supreme Court. The imposition of a market power
test as a threshold requirement for summary judgment of cases involving vertical nonprice restraints is a clear deviation from the direction
established by the Court. Such an action by an inferior court is a serious error.
Another serious error, and one for concern, is the Assam Drug
court's submission to the siren song of the philosophy of economic efficiency. The version of this philosophy adopted by the court is that
promulgated by Judge Bork and Judge Posner. 70 By rejecting prece66. State of New York ex rei. Abrams v. Annheuser-Busch, Inc., 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
11 67,777.
67. Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d at 318 (8th Cir. 1986).
68. Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. ltek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1569 (1983).
69. 798 F.2d at 315-16.
70. !d. at 316.
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dent and substituting for it the position espoused by a particular philosophy, the court is, in effect, substituting its own values for those of
society. Interestingly, the court questions the legitimacy of such a move,
but is not dissuaded. 71 The problem, however, is not so much judicial
activism as it is what the activism is attempting to attain: the philosophy of economic efficiency.
There are a number of problems with this philosophy's approach
to jurisprudence and there is a substantial body of literature dealing
with those problems. 72 The most common criticism of the philosophy is
its reduction of humanity to mere elements of equations. 73 As a result
of this reduction the unjust treatment of some members of society is not
only ignored, but is legitimated. 74 "[A]dvocacy of law and economics
signals a preference for the established order and an ungenerosity toward those outside of the circle of advantage and power." ~ This certainly holds true in the antitrust context. Given the not-so-rare scenario
of a plaintiff with limited resources attempting to pursue a claim
against a powerful defendant, the antitrust positions advocated by the
philosophy of economic efficiency (e.g. the market power requirement)
tend to disadvantage plaintiffs-those who are often outside the circle
of privilege.
Moreover, market efficiency is only one of the goals of the antitrust laws.
7

Antitrust should serve consumers' interests and should also serve
other, established, non-conflicting objectives. There are four major
historical goals of antitrust, and all should continue to be respected.
These are: (1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity to compete on the merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4)
protection of the competition process as market governor. 76

In addition to historical goals, there are also political goals.
[It] is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political
values in interpreting the antitrust laws. By 'political values', I mean,
71. /d. at 316 n.15.
72. See e.g., Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293, 347 (1984); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
73. In an extreme example involving teenage runaways forced into prostitution, Kelman
points out that under this way of thinking "[t]he 'transactions' between hooker and john are presumably 'value-maximizing.' The price the john is willing to pay presumably compensates the
hooker for whatever disutility she experiences." Kelman, supra note 72 at 347.
74. /d.
75. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a
Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 588 (1986).
76. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CoRNF.LL L. RF.v. 1140,
1182 (1981).
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first, a fear that excessive concentration of economic power will breed
antidemocratic political pressures, and second, a desire to enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range within which
private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of all. A third and overriding political concern is that if the freemarket sector of the economy is allowed to develop under antitrust
rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the likely result will
be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be
impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic
affairs. 77

The Supreme Court has also noted that economic efficiency is not
the only goal of the antitrust laws. Justice White points out that another goal is "freedom of the businessman to dispose of his own goods
as he sees fit . . . . " 78 Another goal was enunciated by Chief Justice
Warren in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States: 79
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give
effect to that decision. 80

The adoption of the market power test as a preliminary requirement rejects all of these other goals in favor of economic efficiency. Incredibly enough, the philosophy of economic efficiency had not even
been developed yet in the early part of this century when the Sherman
Act was legislated. 81 It is, therefore, hard to see how it could be the sole
goal of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, because the philosophy tends to
be at odds with many of the values our society cherishes, it should be
the last thing we adopt as a purpose of antitrust law; we certainly
should not adopt it as the purpose of the antitrust laws.

VI.

CoNCLUSION

Showing market power as a threshold requirement for rule of reason analysis is a minority position at odds with the spirit of Supreme
77. Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).
78. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 67 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting).
79. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
80. !d. at 344.
81. The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Economic efficiency was
first used in antitrust analysis in the 1950's. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925 (1979).
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Court case law and many commentators. It is also inappropriate for use
in summary judgment because it is so fact-intensive. More importantly,
however, it forecloses the antitrust laws from operating to fulfill their
many purposes. Because of these reasons Assam Drug Co. v. Miller
Brewing Co. should not be used by other courts as precedent and the
requirement of an initial showing by plaintiffs of a defendant's market
power should be struck down by the Supreme Court.

Brian L. Dew

